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This paper studies the effects of domestic and foreign demand impulses in euro area
economies following the Great Recession of 2008-09 and the Eurozone crisis of 2011-12.
Using a global Input-Output framework we apply a set of metrics to assess spillover ef-
fects of international trade in intermediates triggered by the dynamics of final demand.
Our findings suggest that while cross-country trade spillovers have played a crucial
role during the Great Recession, they have had a moderate impact when compared
to the role of domestic sources of final demand during the Eurozone crisis. Hence, a
strategy of coordinated fiscal austerity cannot be sustained by empirical evidence.
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1. Introduction
The Eurozone is undergoing a systemic crisis whose impact, beyond its financial
dimension, can be analysed from different perspectives. One approach is to study
the consequences of structural interdependence among its member economies and,
more specifically, the effects of global production, i.e. the ever-finer local specialisa-
tion and geographic fragmentation of manufacturing processes, on domestic income
and employment.
With the current crisis, the measurement of ‘spillover’ effects due to global pro-
duction and finance has become a research priority (e.g. IMF 2013). It has been
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argued, however, that the impact of trade spillovers in the Eurozone is positive,
though small (European Commission 2012, p. 108), and in any case of reduced
importance when compared to financial linkages.1
Thus, some research questions come to the fore. First of all, how have different
members of the Eurozone been affected by trade spillovers during the Great Reces-
sion of 2008-09? In the second place, but more importantly, how these outcomes
compare to the effects of austerity policies undertaken in some euro area countries
during 2011-12? As a matter of fact, the sovereign debt crisis and the tight fiscal
discipline imposed by EU institutions have caused a new recession and soaring
unemployment rates.
Looking at future possible scenarios in the Eurozone, a relevant question is
whether the recessive effects of austerity policies in deficit countries could be com-
pensated by increasing foreign demand coming from surplus economies. If this is
not the case, boosting domestic final demand may be a necessary condition for a
sustained recovery.
This paper aims at answering the above questions by means of a multi-regional
Input-Output scheme, assessing to which extent these views correspond to empir-
ical evidence.
Up to now, research on these issues based on Input-Output techniques has
been quite scarce, probably due to data limitations. Setting up a global multi-
regional inter-industry scheme is truly demanding.2 Such a complex dataset has not
been freely available until the recent release of the World Input-Output Database
(WIOD) Project (Timmer 2012; Dietzenbacher et al. 2013). With this instrument
at hand, it is possible to trace the precise source of final demand which activates
output (and therefore income and employment) of each industry in every Eurozone
country.
We proceed, after this short introduction, with an account of some preceding
efforts to quantify trade spillovers in relation to the Great Recession (Section 2).
We introduce the methodological framework in Section 3; then Section 4 reports
and discusses the empirical results obtained. Finally, Section 5 summarises and
concludes.
1In fact, “the share of financing from surplus countries is larger than the share of exports to these countries”
(European Commission 2012, p. 111).
2A global Input-Output framework requires to know precisely how much of commodity i in country r is
bought by industry j in country s, being necessary to merge national Input-Output tables with merchandise
and service international trade statistics.
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2. Estimation of the impact of the Great Recession and consequent policies
After the financial crisis and the Great Recession, two questions were raised
among macroeconomic analysts: (i) how important demand spillovers have been,
in explaining both the collapse of trade and transmission of the global recession
(e.g. compared to financial linkages across countries) and (ii) the size of the impact
of the fiscal stimuli adopted in individual countries, on themselves and on their
partners, also in view of assessing the fiscal space for coordinated policy alterna-
tives.
As to the first question, we recall that during 2009 there were synchronized
declines in output across most countries of the globe (Antonakakis 2012). World
trade in real terms fell by about 10% between 2008 and 2009,3 exceeding the fall in
real world GDP by a factor of roughly four (Bems et al. 2010, 2011).4 In addition to
trade in final goods, production sharing and trade in intermediate goods played a
crucial role, due to increasing vertical specialisation (di Giovanni, J. and Levchenko,
A. A. 2010).
Essentially, production of intermediates is activated — at a global scale — by the
dynamics of domestic final uses: private and government consumption as well as
gross capital formation. In fact, changes in final demand have been acknowledged
to be the main explanation of the collapse in world trade during the Great Re-
cession (Bems et al. 2012).5 Hence, the interpretation of this episode in terms of
international contagion of effective final demand failures, with particular attention
to compositional (investment) and sectoral (intermediates and durables) effects,
has gained momentum in recent years (Eaton et al. 2011).
As to the second question, it must be noticed that domestic demand still plays
a prominent role in most of the economies under analysis. Hence, the dichotomy
between fiscal austerity and stimulus cannot be overlooked by merely focusing
on trade spillovers. What is sure is that when austerity measures are taken by
several countries at the same time, their impact — on production, income and
employment — is much higher. For example, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012),
3Between 2008 and 2009, world imports fell by 9.99% at constant 2005 prices in US Dollars (Source: UNSD
National Accounts Main Aggregates Database, December 2012 release).
4Note that this amplified co-movement between trade flows and income has seen an unprecedented increase
during the last decades: the long-run elasticity of world trade to GDP between 1985 and 2000 has been
estimated at 3.39 (Irwin 2002, p. 96).
5The decline of real expenditure with its compositional effects have been considered of much greater
importance than, for example, trade credit constraints (Levchenko et al. 2010).
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besides confirming that trade can be an important channel of how fiscal shocks are
propagated across countries, show that “amplified fiscal spillovers would increase
the argument in favor of coordinated fiscal stimulus” (p. 15).
Hence, both research questions are inextricably intertwined. For example, Liu
(2009) quantifies the impact of the global financial crisis on China through a struc-
tural vector auto-regression analysis. The finding is that the impact is indeed size-
able: a 1% decline in economic growth in the USA, the EU and Japan is likely to
lead to a 0.73% decline in growth in China one year later. He also finds that that
the massive fiscal stimulus adopted in the country largely offsets the significant
shortfalls in external demand. It is estimated that the fiscal stimulus package will
be able to generate additional growth in the range of 4-5%.
In the case of the EU, some studies have analysed the impact at a regional level
too. For instance, Rivera (2012) has investigated the uneven impact of the economic
crisis on the territory of the EU; he remarked that the economic crisis primarily
hit regions specializing in the manufacturing sector, although the largest unem-
ployment increases occurred in regions with a high dependence on construction.
As refers to research specifically devoted to the impact of fiscal stimuli, Co-
enen G. and Trabandt (2012) focus on the European Economic Recovery Plan
(EERP) enacted in response to the financial crisis of 2008-09. In total, the fiscal
stimulus measures amount to 1.1% and 0.8% of GDP in the years 2009 and 2010,
respectively6 (this in addition to the operation of automatic fiscal stabilisers and to
the extra budgetary actions, such as capital injections, loans and guarantees to the
financial sector). The authors find that EERP had a sizeable, although short-lived,
impact on Eurozone GDP. The large impact derives from fiscal multipliers larger
than one for government consumption and investment, in presence of adequate
monetary accommodation.7
In this respect, the recent debate on the size of fiscal multipliers — among macro-
economists and econometricians — has relevant policy implications. In fact, the
supporters of tough austerity measures, in order to consolidate public finances, ar-
6Support for households’ purchasing power (reduction in VAT, direct taxes, social security contributions,
as well as direct aid, such as income support for households and support for housing or property markets)
accounts for about 40% of the total stimulus. Support for investment (infrastructures and public invest-
ment) and businesses (reduction of taxes and social security contributions, subsidies, export promotion,
etc.) account for roughly 30% and 20% of the total stimulus, respectively. Labour-market actions (wage
subsidies and active labour-market policies) account for about 10% of the total stimulus.
7The estimation is made by means of an extended version of the ECB’s New Area-Wide Model (an open-
economy DSGE model) with a richly specified fiscal sector.
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gue that fiscal multipliers are rather low and consequently restrictive fiscal policies
do not cause large falls in income and production. On the other hand, even the
IMF (2012) now maintains that the value of the fiscal multipliers, since the Great
Recession, has significantly increased, suggesting a more gradual fiscal adjustment.8
However, macro-econometric analyses of this sort are usually based on complex
relationships between aggregate magnitudes,9 hindering the emergence of aggregate
properties coming from inter-industry interactions between thousands of industries
in different countries around the globe. It may turn out that sectoral composition
of production and trade is of utmost importance to assess aggregate outcomes for
income and employment.
In fact, Groot et al. (2011), in investigating the impact of the crisis on European
countries and regions, consider three classes of explanations: (i) the extent to which
countries are integrated in the global economy via financial and trade linkages, (ii)
the differences in their institutional frameworks, and (iii) the differences in their
sectoral composition. The latter turns out to be the most important factor.
By acknowledging this insight, few recent studies have dealt with the research
questions at stake by resorting to multi-regional Input-Output analysis, where each
region represents a national economy. For example, Bems et al. (2010) use a global
Input-Output framework to quantify US and EU demand spillovers and the elas-
ticity of world trade to GDP during the global recession of 2008-09. The estimated
elasticity of world trade to GDP is 2.8, when final demand changes in all coun-
tries.10 In particular, they find that 20-30% of the decline in the US and EU final
demand was borne by foreign countries, especially NAFTA and emerging Europe,
respectively.11
Our paper goes precisely in this direction, by introducing a set of metrics to
quantify the share of own income activated by different sources of foreign final
demand in a global accounting framework. We focus not only on structural relations
8It has even been concluded that “growth disappointments should be larger in economies that planned
greater fiscal cutbacks”(Blanchard and Leigh 2013, p. 3).
9This is also the case of Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), who adopt an innovative method to identify
fiscal shocks and apply it to a large set of OECD countries.
10Thus, for an elasticity of 4, demand forces alone account for roughly 70% of the trade collapse. Crucially,
the estimated elasticity of trade to GDP is high because the model allows for asymmetries in demand
changes across sectors. Their analysis reflects in particular the role played by durable goods, which are
both highly traded as a final demand component and tightly integrated into global supply chains.
11However, due to the database they employ (GTAP 7 for year 2004), and the estimation method adopted
for off-diagonal inter-regional trade matrices, results concerning year 2008-09 might have to be treated
with care.
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(i.e. year-by-year coefficient ratios), but also on the computation of actual and
model-implied demand-induced GDP changes.
However, differently from traditional domestic multiplier analyses discussed
above (e.g. Coenen G. and Trabandt 2012), our paper deals with an ‘open’ global
Input-Output scheme where consumption and investment are not endogenised as a
function of income. Hence, the transmission mechanism at work, i.e. final demand
trade spillovers, corresponds to the operation of domestic and international ‘Leon-
tief’ multipliers, triggered by inter-country linkages of final demand. Therefore,
in principle, it is not possible to make accurate comparisons between multipliers
computed under these two different methodologies. Note, however, that both no-
tions may be conceptually related, e.g. “[w]ith increasing fragmentation, domestic
multiplier effects of fiscal stimulus programs will be lower, while foreign spillovers
increase” (Timmer et al. 2012, p. 27).
On grounds of method, the case for pursuing a global Input-Output accounting
exercise, with respect to standard techniques, may also be considered. First, rather
than performing out-of-sample prediction of endogenous variables during crisis pe-
riods (as in calibrated DSGE models or VAR specifications), we perform a purely
accounting exercise of the Great Recession, decomposing actual changes in income
attributable to actual changes in domestic final demand in every region. Second,
by adopting an Input-Output structure, we take a clear-cut theoretical position
as regards the induced character of vertical specialisation. In many econometric
specifications (e.g. Beetsma et al. 2006, p. 660), nothing prevents that lagged in-
termediate exports may be used to explain contemporaneous exports of final goods,
which we find difficult to justify, from a theoretical point of view.
In the third place, as regards definitional issues, in canonical GVAR specifications
(e.g. Pesaran et al. 2004, p. 132), contemporaneous domestic prices and quanti-
ties are linked with lagged and contemporaneous prices and quantities, using a
fixed constant matrix of bilateral trade as weights. But how can it be consistent
to evaluate cross-country effects in output while assuming a constant or predeter-
mined average value for such a crucial component of GDP such as exports? By
adopting an accounting approach domestic magnitudes are not linked through in-
direct statistical relationships, but through consistent actual accounting identities.
Finally, there is also an important conceptual difference between our approach and
standard DSGE models. Within the latter, spillovers are given a behavioural inter-
pretation: “if it [spillover] is meant to refer to unintended consequences, there are
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no spillovers when policy reaction functions take into account other policymakers’
instruments” (Corsetti in the Panel discussion of Beetsma et al. 2006, p. 685). On
the contrary, our definition of spillover is solely based on observable and measurable
magnitudes. We view this as an essential point in conveying the fact that empiri-
cal general interdependence overrides the methodological individualism implied by
such a behavioural definition of spillover.
To sum up, besides providing a set of metrics based on a global Input-Output
accounting scheme, our main contribution lies in performing an analysis of final
demand trade spillovers for euro area economies not only during the Great Reces-
sion (2008-09), but also in relation to the Eurozone crisis (2011-12). In view of the
enduring consequences of these two recessive episodes, it would be useful for the
design of coordinated policy alternatives to quantify their impact on GDP. This is
approached in the sections that follow.
3. Methodology
3.1 Basic accounting framework
The main accounting identity for the expenditure side of a global system with K
regions with n industries in each of them and three components of final demand
u = {cg, cp, gcf} is given by:12
z ≡ Xex + Fef (1)
By defining the matrix of intermediate production and trade (X) in intensive
terms (per unit of industry gross output): A := Xẑ−1, we obtain an (n × K) ×
(n×K) “global sourcing matrix” (Stehrer and Ward 2012, p. 166), capturing the
requirements of domestic or foreign intermediates by every industry in every region
of the system.
12The three components of final demand are: government consumption (cg), private consumption (cp),
which includes the consumption expenditure of Non-profit institutions serving households (NPISH), and
gross capital formation (gcf), which includes gross fixed capital formation, changes in inventories and
valuables. Appendix A below specifies the notation regarding the meaning and dimension of each vector
and matrix used. All throughout the paper, vectors are indicated by lower case boldface characters (e.g. z),
and are column vectors unless explicitly transposed (e.g. zT ), while matrices are indicated by upper case
boldface characters (e.g. X), except for lower case characters with a hat (e.g. ẑ), indicating diagonal
matrices with the vector elements on the main diagonal. Moreover, e = [1 . . . 1]T is used to represent sum
vectors of different dimensions according to the corresponding subindex (e.g. ex, ef , en).
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Global production is directly linked by matrix A. However, by looking at the eco-
nomic process as a circular flow (Leontief 1928), this framework allows to explicitly
account for indirect linkages between each source of final demand (in matrix F) and
(consequent) gross value added and (originating) employment (which are income
side magnitudes), assessing to which extent these are induced or activated by each
final buyer. In this way a scalar figure for each “final demand-source industry”
combination may summarise the comprehensive operation of the global network of
intermediate inputs. To do this we first define the (n×K)× (3×K) matrix S:
S
(nK)×(3K)
:= ẑ−1BF =

s
cp,1
1,1 s
cg,1
1,1 s
gcf,1
1,1 · · · scp,K1,1 scg,K1,1 sgcf,K1,1
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
s
cp,1
n,1 s
cg,1
n,1 s
gcf,1
n,1 · · · scp,Kn,1 scg,Kn,1 sgcf,Kn,1
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
s
cp,1
1,K s
cg,1
1,K s
gcf,1
1,K · · · scp,K1,K scg,K1,K sgcf,K1,K
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
s
cp,1
n,K s
cg,1
n,K s
gcf,1
n,K · · · scp,Kn,K scg,Kn,K sgcf,Kn,K

(2)
where B := (I − A)−1 is the global Leontief inverse. Note that each element of
matrix S = [su,si,r ] stands for the proportion of gross output of industry i = 1 . . . n in
region r = 1, . . . ,K that is activated by final demand component u = {cg, cp, gcf}
of region s = 1, . . . ,K.
Given that the rows of matrix S sum to one, exhausting the value of gross output
by industry in each region, we may decompose the proportion of value added (v̂)
or employment (̂l) for every source industry in all regions activated by each final
demand component:
v = v̂ex = (v̂S)ef = Mvef (3)
l = l̂ex = (̂lS)ef = Mlef (4)
For example, each element of Mv = [m
u,s
i,r ] represents the income of industry
i = 1 . . . n in region r = 1, . . . ,K that is activated by final demand component
u = {cg, cp, gcf} of region s = 1, . . . ,K. Thus, convenient aggregation of Mv or
Ml by activated industries (column-wise) and by activating source of final demand
(row-wise) allows us to quantify, at different levels, the direct, internally derived
and spillover effects on value added (income) and employment, triggered by global
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final demand.13
With these basic elements in mind, our aim is to derive country-aggregate con-
sequences of disaggregated industry-specific final demand impulses, by means of
a series of metrics introduced below: the structural dependence of ‘activated’ on
‘activating’ regions, foreign trade spillovers triggered by final demand and, finally,
sources of changes in employment.14
3.2 Metrics
3.2.1 Domestic income generated by foreign final demand
A possible measure of structural dependence of region r on region s consists in
computing the proportion of value added in region r activated by final demand of
region s:
θr,sv = (1/yr)
∑
u
eTrMve
(u)
s (5)
for u = {cg, cp, gcf}, r = 1, . . . ,K and s = 1, . . . ,K, where aggregate income for
activated region r is given by: yr = e
T
rv = e
T
rMvef =
∑
s
∑
u e
T
rMve
(u)
s .
For example, θdeu,itav represents the proportion of German income activated or
induced by Italian final demand. Note that this concerns Italian demand not only
for German products but for any source of net output. Hence, this measure includes
comprehensive spillover and feedback effects: Italian final demand for French prod-
ucts which require German inputs to be produced indirectly contribute to German
GDP. This is all captured in θdeu,itav . Hence, the evolution of θ
r,s
v describes the ulti-
mate sources of final demand which generate income in each region, thus assessing
the dependence of an activated country on all others as well as on its own domestic
demand.
13In order to aggregate, two basic summation rules that we will use throughout are: eTx =
∑
r e
T
r and
ef =
∑
s
∑
u e
(u)
s . For an accurate specification of vectors ex, ef , er, e
(u)
s see Appendix A.
14We thank an anonymous referees for calling our attention on the need to justify our procedure of
introducing a multi-sectoral accounting framework and then reporting aggregate country-level results. The
key point to be grasped is that country-level aggregation is performed only after disaggregated sectoral
computations have been carried out. There is a crucial difference between aggregating first and then
inverting a matrix, with respect to inverting a matrix first and then aggregating the results, due to the
fact that matrix inversion is a non-linear operation. Hence, compositional effects still play a crucial role,
as each component is specified in its full sectoral dimension, and it is only when results at the most
detailed level are obtained that a bottom-up aggregation is performed. This notwithstanding, exploring
the industry-level differences composing a country-aggregate spillover figure is a very relevant question for
further research, especially within a global Input-Output accounting framework.
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3.2.2 Final Demand Trade Spillovers
A quantitative assessment of income reductions induced by final demand should
distinguish between domestic and foreign determinants. As a starting point, con-
sider matrix Mv defined in equation (3) above. By assuming that only final demand
matrix F is changing amongst the components of Mv, we may apply element-wise
growth rates of final demand to matrix Mv and obtain the resulting trade spillovers.
Mathematically, we compute:15
gr,s(u)v = (1/yr)e
T
r (Mv ◦Gf )e(u)s , gr,sv =
∑
u
gr,s(u)v , g
r
v =
∑
s
gr,sv (6)
where Gf = [g
u,s
i,r ] is a matrix of dimension (n×K)×(3×K) containing the growth
rates of final demand. For example, G
cp,deu
food,ita is the growth rate of German private
consumption demand for Italian food products. Note that g
r,s(u)
v may be further
aggregated by final demand component (obtaining gr,sv ), as well as by regional
source of activating demand (obtaining grv). Hence, g
r,s
v provides a bilateral measure
of the exposure of country r to changes in final demand of country s, while grv
provides a synthetic indicator of income changes in country r induced by final
demand, regardless of their source of origin.
Additionally, we may specify the change in each final demand component u of
every activating region s, with respect to aggregate domestic final demand fs as:
g
s(u)
f = (1/fs)e
T
x(F ◦Gf )e(u)s , gsf =
∑
u
g
s(u)
f (7)
with fs =
∑
r
∑
u e
T
rFe
(u)
s , and where we aggregate over final demand components
g
s(u)
f to obtain g
s
f .
Note that any proportional change in domestic final demand does not necessarily
translate into an equal proportional change in own income. But given that, in a
global setting, the aggregate change in world income equals the aggregate change in
global final demand, part of domestic demand changes are most probably absorbed
by foreign countries. Hence, the extent to which changes in domestic final uses are
borne by others provides a measure of trade spillovers. With gr,sv and gsf , a synthetic
indicator of country-specific final demand trade spillovers — due to Bems et al.
15Operator ◦ indicates the element-wise scalar product between two matrices of the same dimension (the
Hadamard product), i.e. [A ◦B]ij = [A]ij [B]ij .
em-ng-alw-wiot-EZcrisis-iraw-GRO
11
(2010) — may be obtained in our framework by computing:
λrv = 1−
gr,rv
grf
(8)
where λrv “captures the share of the change in final demand that is borne by foreign
countries” (Bems et al. 2010, p. 310). Intuitively, for a negative shock, λrv conveys
the idea of the percentage of the change in domestic demand that ‘leakages’ into
income reductions of others.
As a complementary measure, we compute the proportional change in income of
country r originating from final demand changes of countries s 6= r, with respect
to the weighted average of proportional demand changes in these countries:
ϕrv =
∑
s 6=r g
r,s
v∑
s 6=r g
s
f (fs/
∑
s6=r fs)
(9)
Intuitively, ϕrv conveys the idea of the extent to which an economy can take
advantage of, or be particularly affected by, demand changes in the rest of the world.
This metric may be plausibly interpreted as an elasticity (a ratio of proportional
changes). Hence, a value greater than one indicates that the response of own income
to changes in foreign demand has been more than proportional, while a value close
to zero suggests that the effect of domestic demand dominates over global dynamics.
Both λrv and ϕ
r
v play a crucial role in explaining the connection between own
income changes and different sources of final demand. We may see this by departing
from equation (6), adopting the perspective of country r, and making explicit the
separation between domestic (r) and foreign (s 6= r) sources:
grv =
∑
s
gr,sv = g
r,r
v +
∑
s 6=r
gr,sv (10)
From (8) we have that:
gr,rv = (1− λrv)grf (11)
while from (9) we may obtain:
∑
s 6=r
gr,sv = ϕ
r
v
∑
s 6=r g
s
ffs∑
s 6=r fs
(12)
Hence, by introducing (11) and (12) into (10) we may finally decompose demand-
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induced income changes in country r into two determinants:
grv = (1− λrv)grf︸ ︷︷ ︸
own demand
+ϕrv
∑
s 6=r g
s
ffs∑
s 6=r fs︸ ︷︷ ︸
others’ demand
(13)
Notably, expression (13), for given technical conditions, allows to explain income
changes by means of a weighted average of changes in domestic and foreign final
demand, the weights being (the complement to one of) λrv and ϕ
r
v, respectively.
Finally, in order to obtain a more detailed picture of each activating foreign
source of demand, we compute the ‘contribution to growth’ of each component of
final demand u in every activating region s to the aggregate change in income of
activated region r:
δr,s(u)v =
eTr (Mv ◦Gf )e(u)s
eTr (Mv ◦Gf )ef
, δr,sv =
∑
u
δr,s(u)v (14)
For example, δita,deuv stands for the percentage of the aggregate change in Italian
income which can be attributed to changes in German final demand.
3.2.3 Structural decomposition of changes in employment
Structural decomposition analysis is a technique that allows to decompose the
change in a variable into changes in its determinants. In this case, we focus on
the change in matrix Ml = âlBF between 2008 (t = 0) and 2009 (t = 1).
16
Being defined as the product of three elements: unitary direct labour requirements
(âl), total (direct and indirect) input requirements per unit of monetary output
(B) and final demand by region and component (F), changes in matrix Ml are
due to the composite change of its determinants. Each possible decomposition of
its growth should leave two components fixed while allowing for the third one to
change between time periods. Hence, from among the 3! = 6 possible combinations
we have chosen to compute:
∆Ml : = Ml1 −Ml0
= âl1B1F1 − âl0B0F0
= âl0B0(F1 − F0) + âl0(B1 −B0)F1 + (âl1 − âl0)B1F1 (15)
16From (2) and (4), matrix Ml = l̂S can also be expressed as Ml = l̂ẑ
−1BF. Defining âl = l̂ẑ−1 as the
diagonal matrix of direct labour requirements per unit of monetary gross output of each industry in every
region, gives Ml = âlBF.
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As has been rightly pointed out by Dietzenbacher and Los (1998), in the presence
of discrete time periods elapsing between observations, decompositions cannot be
unique. Therefore, while reporting the relative standard deviation of multiple de-
composition forms in Appendix B, we here provide an economic intuition as regards
the choice of (15).
We aim to separate the operation of three effects: (i) final demand — âl0B0(F1−
F0), (ii) total intermediate input requirements — âl0(B1 −B0)F1, and (iii) direct
labour requirements — (âl1 − âl0)B1F1.
(i) As a first step we evaluate the change in final demand with unchanged tech-
nique. This provides a measure of the importance of trade in final commodities,
without involving any change in secondary or induced effects that demand trig-
gers.
(ii) Changing final demand naturally affects the coefficients of the Leontief inverse
B, with two possible counterbalancing outcomes. On the one hand, foreseen
demand contraction reduces orders, thus reducing the transactions per unit of
gross output in the system: coefficients decrease. On the other hand, a falling
net output, ceteris paribus, causes coefficients to increase, as from the same
intermediate transactions a lower net product is obtained. Hence, if the first
effect prevails, so gross output falls proportionally more than final demand,
coefficients are reduced. If instead the second effect prevails, so gross output
reductions are ‘lagged’ with respect to demand shrinking, then coefficients in-
crease. To consider the interplay between these effects, direct labour coefficients
take their original value (al0) and we evaluate changes in B according to new
demand conditions (F1).
(iii) Lastly, we consider changes in direct labour requirements per unit of gross
output (al). Given that employment dynamics is generally lagged with respect
to production, this should be the last effect to be measured. Hence, we evaluate
the change in direct labour with new intermediate inputs and final demand
conditions.
In this way, for each “final demand-source industry” combination it is possible
to decompose the change in employment into the three above-mentioned determi-
nants. By conveniently aggregating ∆Ml as defined in (15) a quantitative assess-
ment of the impact of the Great Recession of 2008-09 on employment is attempted
in Section 4.
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On the basis of the set of metrics just introduced, the following section reports
the results of their application to analyse Euro Area economies during the Great
Recession (2008-09) and the Eurozone Crisis (2011-12).
4. Empirical computations and discussion of results
The main data source to perform the empirical computations has been the World
Input-Output Database (WIOD) Project (Timmer 2012),17 which provides a times-
series of square18 industry × industry Input-Output tables at basic current (and
past-year) prices for the period 1995-2009. The WIOD setting consists in 41 re-
gions,19 with 35 industries each, obtaining 41 × 35 = 1435 geo-industries. The
Multi-regional Input-Output scheme provided by this database conforms to the
requirements needed to set-up the accounting framework discussed in Section 3.
The empirical exploration performed in the present paper explicitly focuses on a
selection of eleven Eurozone countries, grouped in two categories:20 (i) the core-EZ
group, i.e. five surplus countries in the Eurozone (Germany, the Netherlands, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Finland) and France; (ii) the PIIGS group, i.e. four deficit Eurozone
countries (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain) and Ireland.21
Both groups include an outlier. In the case of core-EZ, the outlier is France; as
opposed to the rest of the group, France experienced, over the 1995-2009 period,
a strong deterioration of its trade balance, and was characterised in 2009 by a
very large deficit. Italy, the outlier among PIIGS, has also experienced a sharp
deterioration in its trade balance; however, the dimension of its economy and the
characteristics of its industrial system make it quite different from the other four
countries in the group.
17The WIOD Project has been funded by the EC as part of the 7th. Framework Programme, and it
has been developed and deployed by a Consortium of European institutions from the Netherlands, Spain,
Austria, Germany, Belgium, France and Greece. See http://www.wiod.org/ for details. The database can
be accessed for free.
18The fixed product sales structure assumption has been used in the WIOD Project to obtain a square
Input-Output system from a set of International Supply and Use Tables. See Timmer (2012) for details.
19The 41 regions included are: each of the EU27 countries, the U.S., Canada, Mexico, Brazil, China, India,
Japan, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan, Turkey, Indonesia, Russia, and an aggregate RoW region covering
the Rest of the World.
20In order to simplify exposition and comments we have concentrated on a subset of 11 amongst the 17
Euro Area countries, noting however that this subset accounts for 98% of the GDP of the Eurozone.
21All throughout tables and figures we identify these eleven economies by their ISO3 code: Germany
(DEU), the Netherlands (NLD), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Italy
(ITA), Spain (ESP), Greece (GRC), Portugal (PRT) and Ireland (IRL).
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4.1 Trends in global sourcing (1995-2009)
A first characterisation of the trends in international production sharing for the
11 countries analysed emerges by looking at Table 1, which reports the structural
dependence of each activated country on final demand coming from different ac-
tivating regions, i.e. the activated country itself (θr,rv ), the rest of the Eurozone
(θr,RoEZv ), the rest of EU (θ
r,RoEU
v ) and the rest of the world (θ
r,RoW
v ).22
Table 1.: Domestic income activated by own and foreign sources of final demand
(in % of gross value added in each activated country)
Acti- θr,rv θ
r,RoEZ
v θ
r,RoEU
v θ
r,RoW
v
vated 1995 2002 2007 2009 1995 2002 2007 2009 1995 2002 2007 2009 1995 2002 2007 2009
DEU 80.8 72.6 66.8 70.7 7.0 9.2 10.4 8.8 2.9 4.6 5.6 4.2 9.3 13.7 17.1 16.3
NLD 63.4 64.2 62.8 63.5 17.7 15.3 16.1 15.8 5.4 6.3 7.3 6.2 13.5 14.2 13.9 14.5
AUT 76.3 67.4 64.2 67.8 10.6 13.8 14.6 12.2 3.4 5.0 5.5 4.4 9.7 13.8 15.7 15.6
BEL 60.8 57.9 59.1 62.2 23.1 20.4 18.6 17.8 5.2 6.8 6.6 5.6 10.9 14.8 15.7 14.4
FIN 71.0 69.0 68.4 72.8 8.8 9.3 8.8 6.6 5.7 6.5 5.7 4.4 14.6 15.2 17.1 16.3
FRA 82.1 80.1 81.5 83.4 7.2 7.6 7.0 5.7 2.0 2.8 2.6 1.9 8.7 9.5 8.9 9.0
ITA 80.3 80.2 79.0 82.0 8.1 7.1 7.2 5.9 2.0 2.8 2.9 2.1 9.7 9.9 10.9 10.1
ESP 85.0 82.0 83.1 84.5 8.0 8.8 7.7 7.0 1.5 2.8 2.3 1.9 5.5 6.4 6.9 6.5
GRC 93.8 90.1 87.6 88.7 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 0.7 1.2 1.5 1.1 3.0 6.2 8.4 8.2
PRT 81.2 81.2 79.1 81.4 10.5 9.6 10.1 8.6 2.5 2.8 2.5 2.0 5.8 6.4 8.3 8.0
IRL 53.6 47.6 51.4 48.2 18.0 15.7 14.1 14.9 11.7 9.4 8.8 8.4 16.7 27.3 25.7 28.5
Source: Own computations based on WIOD Database
Notes: RoEZ: Rest of Eurozone; RoEU: Rest of the EU27; RoW: Rest of the world
Indicator θr,sv computed according to equation (5).
Between 1995 and 2007 (i.e. before the crisis), the proportion of income gener-
ated by domestic final demand has decreased in all countries (as can be seen by
computing the difference between columns 2007 and 1995 under heading θr,rv of
Table 1); however, with the exception of Ireland, this trend was reversed during
the Great Recession (2008-09). Among PIIGS, Greece and Ireland have increased
their comprehensive dependence on foreign demand by more than 5 p.p. (though
departing from sharply different initial levels), though it is within the core-EZ that
we find the most dramatic structural change due to international fragmentation of
production: Germany and Austria have increased by 14 and 12 p.p., respectively,
22The reading key for a representative row of Table 1 is as follows: for a given row, we have that θr,rv +
θr,RoEUv + θ
r,RoEZ
v + θ
r,RoW
v = 100 in each of the years analysed (1995, 2002, 2007, 2009). Hence, for the
case of Germany (DEU), in 1995, 80.8% of its income (i.e. gross value added) was generated by German
final demand, 7% by the rest of the EZ, 2.9% by the rest of the EU27 (other than the EZ) and 9.3% by
final demand coming from the rest of the world, noting that 80.8 + 7.0 + 2.9 + 9.3 = 100.
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their foreign dependence between 1995 and 2007. This is particularly impressive
for Germany which, by 2007, had acquired a proportion of Own activating demand
similar to that of other small open economies, e.g. the rest of core-EZ economies
with a trade surplus.
A second peculiarity of Germany and Austria is their increasing trend in the
dependence on final demand from Eurozone partners, while for the remaining nine
countries this figure decreased (in a sizeable way in Belgium and Ireland) during
the considered time span. Notably, this is not so for the dependence on final de-
mand coming from (non-EZ) EU27 economies, which increased for all countries
but Portugal and Greece, between 1995 and 2007.23
Notably, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and most of all Ireland out-stand for
their dependence on foreign sources; the contrary holds for Greece, with around
90% of its income being generated from domestic demand. Moreover, the only trend
common to all countries is the increasing importance of final demand coming from
outside the EU in determining own GDP, a trend which is particularly strong in
the case of Ireland and, again, Austria and Germany.24
4.2 The Great Recession (2008-09)
The way in which the trends in production sharing across Eurozone economies
came to terms with the collapse of world trade during the Great Recession may
be inferred from Table 2, which displays synthetic indicators of the trade spillovers
induced by final demand changes on GDP.25
By looking at λrv — column (5) — we obtain the share of domestic final demand
23This asymmetry might suggest that the presence of a common market is of greater importance than the
institution of a common currency in explaining the productive integration among European economies.
24These results are in line with recent findings on Global Value Chains (GVC) using the WIOD
database:“[a]veraged across products, Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands had the most fragmented
GVCs in 2008, followed by Germany, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, where fragmentation increased at
a high pace since 1995. We also find that in 1995, European value chains were mainly fragmented across
other EU countries. Afterwards, however, there has been a strong trend towards increased participation of
non-European countries.” (Los et al. 2013)
25The reading key for a representative row of Table 2 runs as follows. If we consider the case of Germany
(DEU), we note that between 2008 and 2009, demand-induced GDP reductions originating in a drop of
German final demand amounted to 0.43 (percentage) points (gr,rv ), while the comprehensive figure for the
income reduction due to decreasing final demand (irrespective of its source of origin) was 3.79 points (grv).
German domestic final demand fell by 2.31 points (grf ), while world final demand, excluding Germany, fell
by 2.21 points (gs 6=rf ). Spillover figure λ
r
v = 0.82 indicates that 82% of the fall in German final demand (of
2.31 points) was borne by income reductions in foreign countries, while the elasticity value of ϕrv = 1.52 > 1
indicates that the response of own income to changes in foreign demand has been more than proportional.
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Table 2.: Actual Final Demand Trade Spillovers, Great Recession (2008-09)
(columns (1)-(4) in percentage points)
Country Income Demand Spillovers
iso3 gr,rv g
r
v g
r
f g
s6=r
f λ
r
v ϕ
r
v
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DEU -0.43 -3.79 -2.31 -2.21 0.82 1.52
NLD -2.10 -3.66 -4.62 -2.19 0.55 0.71
AUT -0.66 -3.96 -2.85 -2.21 0.77 1.49
BEL -0.92 -2.57 -3.62 -2.21 0.75 0.75
FIN -3.50 -6.42 -6.54 -2.20 0.46 1.33
FRA -1.86 -3.48 -2.34 -2.21 0.21 0.73
ITA -1.29 -3.45 -3.48 -2.17 0.63 1.00
ESP -4.17 -5.35 -6.98 -2.08 0.40 0.57
GRC -1.79 -2.06 -3.04 -2.21 0.41 0.12
PRT -3.37 -5.48 -5.83 -2.20 0.42 0.96
IRL -5.46 -6.49 -13.09 -2.18 0.58 0.47
Source: Own computations based on WIOD Database
Notes: gr,rv is the change in own income induced by a change in domestic final demand,
grv measures total demand-induced GDP changes, g
r
f is the change in domestic final demand,
while gs 6=rf is the weighted average of final demand changes in all countries but r.
Detailed explanation for spillover indicators λrv and ϕ
r
v can be found in section (3.2.2).
Columns (1)-(2), (5) and (6) computed according to equations (6), (8), and (9), respectively.
Column (4) is specified as: gs 6=rf =
∑
s 6=r g
s
f (fs/
∑
s 6=r fs).
Column (2) can be obtained as: (2)=[1-(5)]×(3)+(6)×(4), see (13) for details.
changes which had to be faced by income reductions of other trade partners. Not
surprisingly, for Germany, Austria and Belgium more than 75% of the drop in
domestic final demand was ‘exported’ to others. The fact that these countries’
GDP depends for more than 30% on foreign sources of final demand (as can be
seen from θr,rv for year 2009 on Table 1) helps to explain this fact.
The case of Italy is of interest, given that it structurally depends to a lesser
extent on foreign sources, though during 2009 more than 60% of its drop in final
demand was borne by other countries. This result for Italy acquires more signif-
icance when compared to France, which has almost the same level of structural
foreign dependence (as can be read from Table 1) but almost 80% of the fall in
domestic final demand corresponded to a drop in its GDP, during 2008-09.
Countries with a sharp decline of domestic demand had a relatively lower value
for λrv (e.g. Finland, Spain, Portugal). In fact, it is sensible to guess that λ
r
v for
Ireland would have been higher, had it not been for its dramatic fall in domestic
final demand (-13.09 p.p.). In this connection, from gr,rv /grv — the ratio of columns
(1) to (2) — we infer for which economies the fall in domestic demand has been the
crucial determinant of demand-induced reductions in GDP: Greece, Ireland, Spain
em-ng-alw-wiot-EZcrisis-iraw-GRO
18
and Portugal. On the contrary, by looking at ϕrv — column (6) — we observe
the particularly high amplifying effect of changes in demand from the rest of the
world for income reductions in Germany, Austria and Finland (with ϕrv significantly
greater than unity).
Hence, during the Great Recession, PIIGS have generally been more sensitive to
domestic demand reductions while core-EZ countries have been more vulnerable to
(and inflicting more damage to) their trade partners. Interestingly, the dynamics
of France and Italy went precisely in opposite directions to that of their respective
group, i.e. Italy resembled a core-EZ country, while the crucial role of domestic
demand in France was similar to that of other countries of the Eurozone periphery.
In any case, we have only considered so far demand-induced GDP reductions,
i.e. we have implicitly assumed that the technique in use remained fixed when
computing income changes. However, given that technical coefficients have changed
during the crisis, actual GDP reductions did not coincide with those implied solely
by final demand trade spillovers.
Therefore, if data is available, technique effects should be also considered when
assessing the determinants of sharp GDP reductions, like those observed between
2008 and 2009. Notably, the fact that employment has also had an acute reaction
during the Great Recession, suggests that it might be revealing to decompose actual
changes in employment — rather than GDP — into final demand and technique
effects, in order to clearly see to what extent forms of labour protection prevented
employment from falling accordingly to the full reduction in output.
The latter consideration leads us to consider Table 3, showing the structural
decomposition of employment changes in the Eurozone between 2008 and 2009.26
26As discussed in section 3.2.3, structural decompositions are not unique. We have already provided a
detailed explanation of the rationale for adopting the specification contained in expression (15) above, while
a sensitivity analysis for all possible 6 decompositions is performed in Appendix B, showing that with the
adoption of the present formulation the conclusions obtained in the analysis below are not compromised.
The reading key for a representative row of Table 3 runs as follows. If we consider Germany (DEU), between
2008 and 2009, the change in labour inputs per unit of gross industry output (direct labour coefficients)
contributed to an increase of 1.77 million employment units or 4.42 points (column (i) in absolute value
and percentage points, respectively), the effect of changing total (direct and indirect) intermediate input
coefficients was resposnsible for a negative effect of 428 thousand employment units or 1.06 points (column
(ii)), while domestic final demand reductions implied a decrease in employment of 1.35 million units or
3.37 points (column (iii)). The combination of these three effects is reported under column ‘Total’, which,
for the case of Germany, was slightly negative (a net reduction of 5 thousand employment units), meaning
that labour hoarding practices compensated to a great extent the fall in final demand and intermediate
input coefficients. Percentage points are computed with respect to the 2008 employment level reported
under column ‘Level 2008’.
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Table 3.: Structural Decomposition of Changes in Employment, Great Recession (2008-09)
(employment in 1000 persons engaged) (in p.p. of 2008 level)
Direct Total Final Total Level Direct Total Final Total
Country Labour Inputs Demand 2008 Labour Inputs Demand
(i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii)
DEU 1779.7 -428.7 -1356.1 -5.0 40276.0 4.42 -1.06 -3.37 -0.01
NLD 158.1 6.3 -264.7 -100.3 8730.8 1.81 0.07 -3.03 -1.15
AUT 142.3 -32.2 -146.2 -36.0 4253.1 3.35 -0.76 -3.44 -0.85
BEL 89.9 3.8 -109.6 -15.8 4454.0 2.02 0.09 -2.46 -0.36
FIN 90.0 -7.1 -154.2 -71.3 2525.3 3.56 -0.28 -6.11 -2.82
FRA 748.4 -85.0 -985.7 -322.4 25883.1 2.89 -0.33 -3.81 -1.25
ITA 869.2 -401.9 -888.9 -421.6 25260.2 3.44 -1.59 -3.52 -1.67
ESP -716.4 390.1 -1038.8 -1365.0 20545.9 -3.49 1.90 -5.06 -6.64
GRC 45.5 0.0 -79.4 -33.9 4791.6 0.95 0.00 -1.66 -0.71
PRT 36.2 152.3 -323.3 -134.7 5226.9 0.69 2.91 -6.19 -2.58
IRL -38.1 46.3 -178.9 -170.7 2098.7 -1.81 2.21 -8.53 -8.13
Total 3205.0 -356.0 -5525.8 -2676.8 144045.6 2.23 -0.25 -3.84 -1.86
Source: Own computations based on WIOD Database
Notes: Structural Decomposition computed according to equation (15)
While the overall outcome of the contraction in global final demand is negative for
all countries, we can decompose it into four items, whose sign varies across regions:
(i) the effect of changes in unitary direct labour requirements (Direct Labour); (ii)
the effect of changes in input requirements per unit of monetary output (Total
Inputs); and (iii) the effect of decreasing final demand (Final Demand). According
to the sign combination of these effects, we identify three cases:
(1) Germany, Austria, Finland, France, Greece and Italy: Effect (i) is positive,
while effects (ii) and (iii) are negative. During recessions, intermediate trans-
actions of circulating capital items tend to decrease and being substituted with
a reduction in inventories, which of course would lead to a decrease in input
coefficients. At the same time, however, output goes down, so that unitary
requirements, ceteris paribus, increase. In this case, the former effect prevailed,
and the net outcome is an average decrease of input coefficients. Moreover,
increasing direct labour requirements prevented the loss of about 1.7 million
jobs in Germany, and more than 1.6 million jobs in both France and Italy,
making the net effect much less dramatic than it could have been.
(2) Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal. Effects (i) and (ii) are positive and (iii)
is negative. Though more modest than in the previous case, especially in Por-
tugal, some form of cyclical productivity decrease ameliorated potential em-
ployment reduction. In this case, however, intermediate transactions did not
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go down to such an extent as to counteract the effect of output fall on input
coefficients.
(3) Spain and Ireland. All effects other than (ii) are negative. It deserves to be
noticed that these are the only two countries in which no forms of labour
hoarding were implemented in support of employment; on the contrary, the
Great Recession caused a more than proportional jobs cut, which has been
particularly harsh in Spain. No surprise, therefore, that the economic outlook
for Spain and Ireland were among the worst of the whole Eurozone.
At this point, the question that remains to be faced is the geographical distribu-
tion of final demand impulses which originated GDP reductions during the Great
Recession. To assess the extent of the response of Eurozone incomes to the realised
fall of final demand in the US, we computed — for given technical coefficients, and
by means of equation (14) — the contribution to the change in aggregate gross
value added induced by changes in each component of domestic, as well as foreign,
final demand. Results are reported in Table 4.27
As can be read from column (7) of Table 4, income reductions directly and
indirectly caused by the fall in US final demand have been modest for the economies
analysed, especially when compared to intra-EZ and intra-EU effects — columns (5)
and (6), respectively. Germany, Austria, Belgium and Italy have been particularly
vulnerable to worsening international conditions relative to the fall in domestic
final demand, as can be read from column (4). Moreover, in all countries but
Ireland, general government consumption — column (2) — has played an important
counter-cyclical role, while the dynamics of gross capital formation — column (3)
— remains the crucial source of falling GDP during the Great Recession.
27The reading key for a representative row of Table 4 runs as follows. The row for Germany (DEU)
describes the percentage distribution of demand-induced changes in GDP by source of origin (for a Total
of −100.00 in column (9), the negative sign implying that aggregate income change has been negative).
Thus, we read that domestic final demand (column (4)) accounted for 11.26 points of demand-induced
GDP reductions. Columns (1)-(3) disaggregate further the domestic component, having that private and
government consumption (cp in column (1) and cg in column (2)) go in opposite direction with respect to
the negative effect exerted by gross investments (gcf in column (3)), and noting that 8.05+15.46−34.76 =
−11.2 (i.e. column (4)). The remaining 88.74% of income reductions is explained by changes in foreign
(final) demand (as detailed in columns (5)-(8)): 29.83 points due to the rest of the EZ, 21.92 points due
to the rest of EU27 (other than the EZ), 10.46 points due to the USA, and 26.55 points due to the rest of
the world.
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Table 4.: Contribution to demand-induced GDP growth by originating source of final de-
mand, Great Recession (2008-09)
(contribution to change in country-aggregate gross value added in percentage points)
Domestic components Domestic and foreign sources of final demand
δ
r,r(cp)
v δ
r,r(cg)
v δ
r,r(gcf)
v δ
r,r
v δ
r,RoEZ
v δ
r,RoEU
v δ
r,USA
v δ
r,RoW
v Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DEU 8.05 15.46 -34.76 -11.26 -29.83 -21.92 -10.46 -26.55 -100.00
NLD -35.26 30.53 -52.60 -57.34 -12.77 -16.98 -3.78 -9.13 -100.00
AUT 16.60 4.89 -38.16 -16.67 -38.60 -19.01 -9.20 -16.52 -100.00
BEL 12.51 20.65 -68.77 -35.61 -20.81 -23.11 -2.10 -18.36 -100.00
FIN -9.72 4.21 -49.04 -54.55 -18.57 -13.06 -4.90 -8.92 -100.00
FRA 10.70 7.35 -71.57 -53.52 -18.67 -9.79 -5.24 -12.78 -100.00
ITA -5.07 17.63 -49.83 -37.26 -22.86 -13.56 -7.70 -18.62 -100.00
ESP -27.94 7.69 -57.54 -77.80 -8.34 -5.55 -1.95 -6.36 -100.00
GRC -0.94 85.12 -171.07 -86.89 -9.41 -9.71 -3.12 9.14 -100.00
PRT -26.78 1.51 -36.19 -61.46 -20.51 -6.60 -4.46 -6.97 -100.00
IRL -3.28 -6.45 -74.43 -84.16 -6.34 -9.03 1.96 -2.43 -100.00
Source: Own computations based on WIOD Database
Notes: (4)=(1)+(2)+(3) and (9)=(4)+(5)+(6)+(7)+(8). Contribution to growth indicators
δ
r,s(u)
v and δ
r,s
v computed according to equation (14)
4.3 The Eurozone Crisis (2011-12)
The implementation, from summer 2009, of fiscal stimulus packages in some coun-
tries — together with a slight increase in fixed capital formation, particularly of
machinery — led to a recovery that lasted for the whole 2010, both in core-EZ
countries and, to a smaller extent, in some countries of the Eurozone periphery.
However, the sovereign debt crisis was about to explode.
By the end of 2011, almost all countries amongst PIIGS were implementing
strong fiscal restrictions and drastic reforms of pension systems, labour markets,
and public welfare in general. As a direct consequence of budget consolidation
policies, sharp reductions in government expenditure (between -2.9% and -4.4%)
followed throughout 2012. It seems important, therefore, to provide a quantitative
assessment of the effects of fiscal austerity on the whole set of Eurozone economies
analysed.
While structural decompositions may be computed when full observations for
two time periods are available, in the presence of partial information only isolated
effects can be estimated. In this case, departing from direct labour (al) and total
input (B) requirements for 2009 (the last year of available data in the WIOD
database), we applied to the 2009 final demand matrix (F) a set of growth rates
for the period 2011-12, distinguishing between final demand components (cp, cg,
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gcf) in each activating region s.28 Therefore, matrix Gf took the form:
Gf =

gcp,1 gcg,1 ggcf,1 gcp,2 gcg,2 ggcf,2 · · · gcp,K gcg,K ggcf,K
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
gcp,1 gcg,1 ggcf,1 gcp,2 gcg,2 ggcf,2 · · · gcp,K gcg,K ggcf,K
 (16)
The limitations of applying a uniform growth rate to each column of matrix F are
manifold. Two of particular relevance are: (i) if only F is assumed to be changing,
relevant movements in technical coefficients might remain unattended (precisely
when employment lags begin to be felt as firms are no longer able to follow job
retention practices in the expectation of demand recovery), and (ii) compositional
changes in the structure of final expenditure are not considered. As an aside, by
discussing results in terms of GDP aggregates by region, the sectoral composition of
changes within each country remains in the background, deserving an own separate
exploration.
Differently from the structural decomposition and the actual final demand trade
spillovers, which are strictly an accounting exercise of what has actually happened
between two discrete time-periods, the model-implied demand spillovers — com-
puted under such simplifying assumptions for matrix Gf — might not reveal the
‘whole picture’ of what has been going on during 2012.29 Clearly, the possible in-
teraction between changes in the technique in use and the level and composition
of final demand cannot be ruled out. Hence, keeping all elements of matrix Mv
fixed and studying the implied consequences for a given change in matrix F may
not capture (lagged or contemporaneous) effects of a fall in final demand on, for
example, labour hoarding practices, affecting direct labour coefficients.
With these limitations in mind, model implied income changes triggered by final
demand dynamics during the Eurozone crisis have been computed using the metrics
introduced in section 3.2.2. Synthetic indicators are reported in Table 5.30
To begin with, note that while the dynamics of global final demand has been
expansionary (as can be read from gs 6=rf in column (4) of the Table), the only two
28We thus considered growth rates to be uniform across industries and destination country for a given
component u of final demand from activating country s. Appendix C reports the set of growth rates
utilised for this exercise.
29We thank an anonymous referee for calling our attention on the interplay between final demand and
technical coefficients in estimates of isolated spillover effects.
30The reading key for Table 5 follows the same logic as previously specified for the case of Table 2.
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Table 5.: Model implied Final Demand Trade Spillovers, Eurozone Crisis (2011-12)
(columns (1)-(4) in percentage points)
Country Income Demand Spillovers
iso3 gr,rv g
r
v g
r
f g
s6=r
f λ
r
v ϕ
r
v
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DEU -0.05 0.37 -0.26 2.21 0.80 0.19
NLD -0.84 -0.53 -1.48 2.13 0.43 0.15
AUT 0.06 0.37 0.09 2.09 0.34 0.15
BEL -0.32 -0.11 -0.61 2.10 0.47 0.10
FIN -0.80 -0.29 -1.35 2.09 0.41 0.25
FRA -0.47 -0.28 -0.67 2.21 0.29 0.09
ITA -4.19 -3.94 -5.24 2.35 0.20 0.11
ESP -3.36 -3.31 -3.98 2.24 0.16 0.02
GRC -7.91 -7.65 -9.32 2.15 0.15 0.12
PRT -5.39 -5.27 -6.84 2.12 0.21 0.06
IRL -0.83 -0.12 -1.52 2.09 0.45 0.34
Source: Own computations based on WIOD Database and EC-AMECO May 2013 Release
Notes: gr,rv is the change in own income induced by a change in domestic final demand,
grv measures total demand-induced GDP changes, g
r
f is the change in domestic final demand,
while gs 6=rf is the weighted average of final demand changes in all countries but r.
Detailed explanation for spillover indicators λrv and ϕ
r
v can be found in section (3.2.2).
Columns (1)-(2), (5) and (6) computed according to equations (6), (8), and (9), respectively.
Column (4) is specified as: gs 6=rf =
∑
s 6=r g
s
f (fs/
∑
s 6=r fs).
Column (2) can be obtained as: (2)=[1-(5)]×(3)+(6)×(4), see (13) for details.
countries of the subset analysed with positive demand-induced GDP spillovers have
been Germany and Austria (both with only +0.37 p.p.). And even in Germany the
domestic contribution to demand spillovers has been negative (though approaching
zero). Hence, differently from the Great Recession of 2008-09 (see Table 2), during
2012 the Eurozone has been going against the upward trend of the world economy.
Related to this first point, in all countries but Germany and Austria, the contrac-
tion explained solely by the negative impulse of domestic final demand has been
greater than the total demand-induced GDP fall, i.e. the ratio gr,rv /grv is greater
than one. Hence, in all these countries, foreign demand sources have had a par-
tially offsetting positive effect on income, greater in core-EZ surplus countries like
Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands; while almost negligible for the case of PI-
IGS (with the exception of Ireland). Hence, it seems clear that the contractionary
consequences of austerity policies have not been offset by foreign demand within
the Eurozone periphery (not even for Ireland).
This prevalence of domestic sources in explaining the degree of demand-induced
GDP reductions is confirmed by comparing columns (5) and (6) of Table 5 with
the respective columns of Table 2: higher values for both λrv and ϕ
r
v can be found
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during the Great Recession (2008-09) as compared to the Eurozone crisis (2011-
12). In fact, while for Germany and Finland the share of domestic demand changes
which has to be borne by others — λrv in column (5) — has remained relatively
stable, the reduction for the case of Italy has been dramatic. Thus, the role of the
Italian economy as an agent capable of inflicting potentially destabilising effects to
its trade partners has been reduced.
Predictably, the fall in ϕrv has been more acute than that observed for λ
r
v. Given
that ϕrv captures the extent to which a given economy has been hurt by or taken
advantage of the dynamics of global final demand, the relatively low values for col-
umn (6) of Table 5 make apparent the difficult situation of each Eurozone country
with respect to the world economy. The case of Spain is exemplary: during 2012
the elasticity of domestic income spillovers with respect to the growth of foreign
final demand has been almost zero.
Table 6.: Contribution to demand-induced GDP growth by originating source of final de-
mand, Eurozone Crisis (2011-12)
(contribution to change in country-aggregate gross value added in percentage points)
Domestic components Domestic and foreign sources of final demand
δ
r,r(cp)
v δ
r,r(cg)
v δ
r,r(gcf)
v δ
r,r
v δ
r,RoPEZ
v δ
r,RoCEZ
v δ
r,RoEZ
v δ
r,RoEU
v δ
r,USA
v δ
r,BRIC
v δ
r,RoW
v Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
DEU 73.44 68.16 -155.92 -14.31 -55.78 -16.38 -2.52 -0.34 27.41 74.40 87.53 100.00
NLD -74.35 0.35 -85.18 -159.18 -46.68 -11.76 -0.70 6.92 14.23 43.99 53.18 -100.00
AUT 40.03 -9.49 -13.97 16.57 -55.24 -29.03 -7.73 -5.66 19.47 68.77 92.85 100.00
BEL -160.32 13.38 -156.31 -303.25 -244.89 -128.74 3.67 31.03 71.65 209.41 261.14 -100.00
FIN 227.51 60.82 -566.81 -278.48 -48.07 -18.23 2.98 7.41 22.90 99.28 112.21 -100.00
FRA -16.63 121.46 -276.97 -172.14 -49.54 -12.62 -1.05 4.00 16.81 43.43 71.11 -100.00
ITA -50.70 -15.36 -40.44 -106.50 -2.33 -1.37 -0.28 0.16 1.30 3.61 5.41 -100.00
ESP -29.59 -21.39 -50.33 -101.31 -4.89 -1.54 -0.10 0.36 0.77 2.05 4.66 -100.00
GRC -69.61 -11.11 -22.59 -103.31 -0.39 -0.07 -0.19 0.17 0.23 0.53 3.04 -100.00
PRT -50.79 -17.21 -34.22 -102.22 -3.48 -0.88 -0.04 0.29 0.62 2.72 3.00 -100.00
IRL -197.00 -463.31 -45.11 -705.42 -243.60 -39.65 -1.55 66.18 189.15 185.35 449.55 -100.00
Source: Own computations based on WIOD Database, UNSD National Accounts, EC-AMECO May 2013 Release
Notes: RoPEZ (Rest of PIIGS-Eurozone), RoCEZ (Rest of Core-Eurozone), RoEZ (Rest of Eurozone other
than PIIGS and Core countries), RoEU : Rest of EU27 countries other than EZ.
Columns (4)=(1)+(2)+(3) and (12)=(4)+(5)+(6)+(7)+(8)+(9)+(10)+(11). Contribution to growth indica-
tors δ
r,s(u)
v and δ
r,s
v computed according to equation (14)
To complete the picture given so far, Table 6 displays the geographic distribution
of demand-induced GDP changes by originating source of final demand.31 With the
exception of Germany and Austria, in both core-EZ countries and PIIGS, the most
31The reading key for Table 6 follows the same logic as previously specified for the case of Table 4.
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important determinant of demand spillovers has been the domestic component —
δr,rv in column (4) of the Table, confirming the results of Table 5.
While all core-EZ countries (with the exception of Austria) kept sustained growth
rates of public expenditure — δ
r,r(cg)
v in column (2), GDP reductions brought about
by fiscal consolidation undertaken in Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain ac-
counted for more than 10% of their fall in income.32 Besides their direct effects,
budget consolidation depressed both private consumption and gross capital forma-
tion, especially in Italy, Ireland and Spain.
By looking at δr,RoPEZv in column (5), a key insight of the exercise emerges: for
all core-EZ countries without exception, the drop in final demand from PIIGS
contributed to around 50% of their own GDP reduction. Only for Ireland such a
result can be seen amongst PIIGS.33 Furthermore, effects going in the opposite
direction (from core-EZ to PIIGS) have been negligible.
In the light of this configuration, a relevant question is: to what extent the income
consequences for core-EZ countries induced by the drop in final demand from PIIGS
have been compensated by the positive impulse coming from e.g. BRIC economies?
By computing the difference between columns (5) and (10) we see that while for
Germany, Austria and Finland this negative effect has been more than offset, the
opposite occurs in the Netherlands, Belgium and France. Hence, for three surplus
economies at the heart of the Eurozone, extra-EZ spillovers still dominate over
‘imported’ austerity consequences.34
To sum up, during the Eurozone crisis the drop in domestic final demand has
been the key driver of demand-induced GDP reductions, both for core-EZ countries
(with the exception of Germany and Austria) as well as for PIIGS. When compar-
ing Table 6 with Table 4, the role of trade spillovers during the Great Recession
(2008-09) was clearly of greater relevance. This notwithstanding, first-order nega-
tive effects exerted by PIIGS on core-EZ countries suggests that austerity policies
undertaken within the Eurozone periphery did have sizeable consequences beyond
32The figure for Ireland is particularly striking (-463%), noting that it has been almost entirely offset
exclusively by foreign demand coming from outside the EU, USA and BRIC (+449% under column (11)
of the Table).
33In fact, the case of Ireland emerges with its own peculiarities, being the only country which was able to
take advantage of growth in the US, BRIC and the RoW to the point of (almost entirely) offsetting the
negative demand impulses coming from other Eurozone economies.
34Moreover, note that the effects coming from the remaining six Euro Area economies (not explicitly
analysed), as well as from the rest of EU countries — columns (7) and (8), respectively — are clearly of
a smaller order of magnitude (with the exception of the presumable influence of the UK on Belgium and
Ireland), as compared to those coming from PIIGS.
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national borders. Therefore, if the Eurozone is to achieve a sustained recovery,
pursuing a coordinated fiscal stimulus should not be excluded from the policy al-
ternatives to be considered.
5. Summary of results and concluding remarks
After the financial crisis (2007-08) and the Great Recession (2008-09) that hurt
the global economy, EU countries have been injured by the Eurozone crisis (2011-
12). Its deepening has also been caused by the uncertain, delayed and inadequate
economic policy responses. Then, the euro area has suffered from a new reces-
sion, hitting especially the “PIIGS” (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain)
countries. While unemployment and social pain are soaring, the financial situation
of these countries has not substantially improved; this self-inflicting result is the
consequence of coordinated austerity measures in times of recession.
In considering policy alternatives for the Eurozone it is of utmost importance to
assess the role of effective demand in determining activity levels as well as the in-
ternational trade transmission of final demand impulses. In order to measure these
two phenomena, we have proposed a set of metrics derived from a global Input-
Output framework. From a methodological point of view, we have advanced a
decomposition of demand-induced GDP changes as a weighted average of domestic
and foreign final demand dynamics, the weights being two ‘spillover’ indicators in-
troduced in section 3.2. Moreover, we have analysed the contribution to the growth
of GDP by each foreign source of final demand and, in order to consider the effects
of changing technical coefficients, we have performed a structural decomposition
of employment changes, when data requirements allowed.
The results of the computations performed may be summarised in four key points:
(1) The evolution of the share of domestic income generated by foreign sources
of final demand between 1995 and 2009 (Table 1) showed that: (i) the most
visible effect of global sourcing is the reduction in the share of GDP activated by
domestic demand in Germany and Austria, and (ii) the presence of a common
currency (the euro) has not led to an increase in the share of own income
originated in intra-Eurozone final demand (Germany and Austria being the
only exceptions).
(2) During the Great Recession, PIIGS have generally been more sensitive to do-
mestic demand reductions while core-EZ countries have been more vulnerable
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to (and inflicting more damage to) their trade partners. In fact, as can be read
from Table 2, for Germany, Austria and Belgium more than 75% of the drop
in domestic final demand was ‘exported’ to others. Moreover, from Table 4,
it emerged that demand-induced GDP reductions in Eurozone countries due
to the fall in US final demand have been overall modest, when compared to
intra-EZ and intra-EU spilllovers.
(3) The structural decomposition of employment changes during the Great Re-
cession (Table 3) revealed that in countries where “flexible” labour markets
prevailed (e.g. Spain and Ireland), the evolution of direct labour coefficients
has been pro-cyclical, accelerating employment destruction. It is interesting
the comparison with respect to countries (like France or Belgium) which have
instead been reinforcing dismissal protection (ILO 2012, p. 29). This suggests
a crucial role for employment protection legislation (EPL) in preventing em-
ployment from falling to the same extent as output; a fact that contradicts the
political stance in favour of a complete labour market flexibility, especially if
not accompanied by adequate growth-oriented policies.
(4) The simulation of demand-induced GDP reductions tirggered by austerity poli-
cies in the Eurozone periphery (Tables 5 and 6) suggests that, with the excep-
tion of Germany and Austria, in both core-EZ countries and PIIGS, the most
important determinant of the fall in income has been the domestic compo-
nent of final demand. Moreover, for all core-EZ countries without exception,
the drop in final demand from PIIGS contributed to around 50% of their own
GDP reduction. This notwithstanding, for Germany, Austria and Finland, the
expansion of BRIC countries has more than offset the negative spillovers com-
ing from PIIGS.
These results hint at the consequences of an “export-led” strategy in which all
Eurozone countries pursue a competitive wage deflation by means of loose employ-
ment protection and increased vulnerability to extra-Eurozone demand. It emerged
quite clearly that this state of affairs is not likely to be sustainable.35
Hence, the key policy implication is that, while coordinated austerity measures
are self-inflicting, Eurozone countries should reconsider the prominent role of do-
mestic sources of final demand in determining activity levels, acknowledging that
35Note, in fact, that even the greatest world exporter, China, has seen a reversing trend in its income
dynamics: “[d]omestic final demand for non-tradables has become the main source of growth” (Timmer
et al. 2012, p. 2, italics added).
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spillovers may significantly amplify potential gains from coordinated action.36 Such
a “coordinated domestic demand-led”policy,37 in which fiscal expansion, together
with targeted industrial and income policies, are tipping points for a sustained re-
covery, remains essential. This paper has illustrated comprehensive effects of global
interdependence, though only concentrating on country-level results. Needless to
say, a whole spectrum of multi-sectoral details awaits to be explored.
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Appendix A: Matrix notation
The setting of the World Input-Output Database WIOD (Timmer 2012) consists
in K = 41 regions: 40 individual countries and an aggregate ‘Rest of the World’
(RoW ) region, with n = 35 industries each, obtaining K×n = 1435 geo-industries.
For all magnitudes below subindexes r, s = 1, . . . ,K stand for the activated (r) and
activating (s) region, respectively; while superindex u indicates each of the three
different components of domestic final uses. The basic elements of the expenditure
side of this multi-regional Input-Output scheme are:
X
(1435×1435)
=

X11 · · · X1K
...
. . .
...
XK1 · · · XKK
 ,with Xrs(35×35) (Intermediates)
F
(1435×123)
=

F11 · · · F1K
...
. . .
...
FK1 · · · FKK
 ,with Frs(35×3) (Final Demand)
and Frs
(35×3)
=
[
f
cg
rs f
cp
rs f
gcf
rs
]
,with furs
(35×1)
, u = {cg, cp, gcf}
z
(1435×1)
=

z1
...
zK
 ,with zr(35×1) (Gross Output)
ex
(1435×1)
=

1
...
1
 ef(123×1) =

1
...
1
 en(35×1) =

1
...
1
 (Sum vectors)
eTr
(1×1435)
=
[
0T · · · 0T eTn 0T · · · 0T
]
(Aggregation vector by industry for region r)
e(u)s
(123×1)
=
[
0 · · · 0 1 0 · · · 0
]
T
(Selection vector for final demand component u of region s)
Instead, the income side components considered in the analysis are:
vT
(1×1435)
=
[
vT1 · · · vTK
]
,with vTr
(1×35)
(Gross Value Added)
lT
(1×1435)
=
[
lT1 · · · lTK
]
,with lTr
(1×35)
(Employment)
em-ng-alw-wiot-EZcrisis-iraw-GRO
32 REFERENCES
Appendix B: Sensitivity analysis of the structural decomposition of
employment changes during the Great Recession (2008-2009)
Recall the structural decomposition of employment changes defined in expression
(15) of Section 3.2.3:
∆Ml = Ml1 −Ml0 = âl1B1F1 − âl0B0F0
In order to evaluate whether the conclusions derived from Table 3 depend on
the specification chosen, we have computed all possible 3! = 6 alternative decom-
positions of changes in matrix Ml and assessed the relative variability of each
component.
Expressions (B1)-(B6) specify alternative additive decompositions of changes in
employment:38
∆Ml = (âl1 − âl0)B1F1 + âl0(B1 −B0)F1 + âl0B0(F1 − F0) (B1)
= (âl1 − âl0)B0F0 + âl1(B1 −B0)F0 + âl1B1(F1 − F0) (B2)
= (âl1 − âl0)B0F1 + âl1(B1 −B0)F1 + âl0B0(F1 − F0) (B3)
= (âl1 − âl0)B1F0 + âl0(B1 −B0)F0 + âl1B1(F1 − F0) (B4)
= (âl1 − âl0)B0F0 + âl1(B1 −B0)F1 + âl1B0(F1 − F0) (B5)
= (âl1 − âl0)B1F1 + âl0(B1 −B0)F0 + âl0B1(F1 − F0) (B6)
Table B1 reports the empirical computation of expressions (B1)-(B6) during the
Great Recession (2008-09).
The relative standard deviation (RSD, hereinafter) for every component (Direct
Labour, Total Inputs and Final Demand) in each country, indicates to what extent
the corresponding value has changed under each specification, as compared to their
average. As regards ‘Direct Labour’ effects, only for Italy, Portugal and Greece the
RSD is above 0.1 (and only for Greece it arrives at 0.2), meaning that deviations
do not account for more than 10% of the average value of the effect within each
country. In the case of the ‘Total Inputs’ effect, RSD are higher (particularly for
the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland and France), but the only case where there
is a sign-reversion of the effect is the case of Greece (with an RSD of 1.12).39
38Note that expression (B1) corresponds to the case analysed in the main text, as given by formula (15).
39This effect for Greece is approximately zero, and the cases where it deviates from zero is clearly negative.
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Table B1.: Alternative Structural Decompositions of Employment Changes, Great Reces-
sion (2008-2009)
(employment in 1000 persons engaged)
Direct Labour (∆âl)
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) RSD
DEU 1779.7 2128.5 1904.3 1995.9 2128.5 1779.7 0.08
NLD 158.1 186.1 162.8 181.0 186.1 158.1 0.08
AUT 142.3 168.4 150.7 159.6 168.4 142.3 0.08
BEL 89.9 97.6 91.2 96.2 97.6 89.9 0.04
FIN 90.0 106.2 94.6 101.5 106.2 90.0 0.08
FRA 748.4 875.6 806.2 817.8 875.6 748.4 0.07
ITA 869.2 1121.0 982.2 999.2 1121.0 869.2 0.11
ESP -716.4 -730.0 -675.4 -775.0 -730.0 -716.4 0.04
GRC 45.5 70.1 52.2 63.0 70.1 45.5 0.20
PRT 36.2 46.8 37.5 45.5 46.8 36.2 0.13
IRL -38.1 -32.4 -32.5 -38.2 -32.4 -38.1 0.09
Total Inputs (∆B)
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) RSD
DEU -428.7 -575.9 -553.2 -443.3 -553.2 -443.3 0.14
NLD 6.3 4.3 1.5 9.3 1.5 9.3 0.66
AUT -32.2 -38.8 -40.6 -30.0 -40.6 -30.0 0.15
BEL 3.8 3.1 2.5 4.5 2.5 4.5 0.26
FIN -7.1 -9.7 -11.7 -4.9 -11.7 -4.9 0.38
FRA -85.0 -112.4 -142.8 -54.6 -142.8 -54.6 0.41
ITA -401.9 -545.8 -514.9 -424.0 -514.9 -424.0 0.13
ESP 390.1 379.6 349.1 424.5 349.1 424.5 0.09
GRC 0.0 -6.9 -6.7 0.2 -6.7 0.2 1.12
PRT 152.3 170.0 151.1 171.2 151.1 171.2 0.07
IRL 46.3 45.5 40.7 51.3 40.7 51.3 0.10
Final Demand (∆F)
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) RSD
DEU -1356.1 -1557.6 -1356.1 -1557.6 -1580.3 -1341.4 0.08
NLD -264.7 -290.6 -264.7 -290.6 -287.9 -267.7 0.05
AUT -146.2 -165.7 -146.2 -165.7 -163.9 -148.4 0.06
BEL -109.6 -116.5 -109.6 -116.5 -115.9 -110.2 0.03
FIN -154.2 -167.8 -154.2 -167.8 -165.8 -156.4 0.04
FRA -985.7 -1085.6 -985.7 -1085.6 -1055.2 -1016.2 0.04
ITA -888.9 -996.8 -888.9 -996.8 -1027.7 -866.8 0.07
ESP -1038.8 -1014.6 -1038.8 -1014.6 -984.1 -1073.2 0.03
GRC -79.4 -97.1 -79.4 -97.1 -97.3 -79.6 0.11
PRT -323.3 -351.5 -323.3 -351.5 -332.6 -342.2 0.04
IRL -178.9 -183.8 -178.9 -183.8 -179.1 -184.0 0.01
Source: Own computations based on WIOD Database
Notes: Columns (1)-(6) correspond to each of the alternative decompositions
in equations (B1)-(B6), respectively. Column ‘RSD’ corresponds to the rela-
tive standard deviation (RSD) of each row, computed as RSD = |σx/µx|.
In fact, throughout the analysis in the main text, we have classified Greece into the group of countries
with a negative ‘Total Inputs’ effect.
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Understandably, the fact that this latter effect depends on changes in a full K×K
matrix (B) might give rise to higher variability in some countries. Finally, the
values of RSD associated to the ‘Final Demand’ effect are notably low (only for
Greece it reaches 0.1).
To sum up, these results suggest that there is no risk of misclassifying any of
the countries analysed into a different category than the one to which it has been
assigned by the use of decomposition (B1) in the empirical analysis of Section 4.
Appendix C: Estimates of growth rates of final demand by component and
GDP for WIOD countries (2011-2012)
For each final demand component of each country in the WIOD database a (uni-
form) column-specific growth rate has been applied to estimate income spillovers
during 2011-12. The countries involved are each of the EU27 partners, the U.S.,
Canada, Mexico, Brazil, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan,
Turkey, Indonesia, Russia, and an aggregate RoW region covering the Rest of the
World.
The main sources of estimates for government consumption (cg), private con-
sumption (cp) and gross capital formation (gcf) levels during 2011 and 2012
have been the UNSD Main National Accounts Database (July 2012 Release), EC-
AMECO Database (May 2013 Release), and World Bank’s World Development
Indicators Database (July 2013 Release).
Due to various methodological differences, these sources do not always provide
the same estimate for a given figure. In this cases, we have privileged the UNSD
Main National Accounts Database, being the most complete database for the vari-
ables involved in terms of spatial and time coverage.
Moreover, to estimate the figures for the RoW region, we have computed World
values for the variables concerned, and deduced from this grand total the sum of
the respective values for all the 40 countries individually present in the dataset.
The results are reported in Table C1 below.
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Table C1.: Growth rates of domestic final demand by component and GDP (2011-2012)
(in percentage points)
Country Cg Cp GCF GDP Country Cg Cp GCF GDP
Core Eurozone Rest of EU27
DEU 1.38 0.65 -5.41 0.66 BGR -1.35 2.59 9.57 0.78
NLD 0.01 -1.43 -4.15 -0.96 CZE -0.96 -3.54 -3.25 -1.28
AUT -0.19 0.40 -0.41 0.79 DNK 0.17 0.56 -0.23 -0.47
BEL 0.06 -0.56 -1.59 -0.20 GBR 2.20 1.18 0.85 0.27
FIN 0.78 1.73 -13.26 -0.21 HUN -2.26 -1.41 -11.60 -1.73
FRA 1.40 -0.10 -5.28 -0.05 LTU 0.68 4.75 -18.00 3.62
PIIGS LVA -0.18 5.14 -0.39 5.58
ITA -2.93 -4.25 -11.15 -2.37 POL 0.05 0.77 -3.09 1.78
ESP -3.66 -2.13 -8.69 -1.42 ROU 1.66 1.06 2.11 0.69
GRC -4.23 -9.07 -17.54 -6.38 SWE 1.24 1.54 -2.55 0.89
PRT -4.41 -5.62 -13.66 -3.17 BRIC
IRL -3.38 -0.93 -0.76 0.94 BRA -1.69 0.08 8.41 0.87
Rest of Eurozone (RoEZ) RUS -6.51 4.87 4.69 3.44
CYP -1.66 -2.99 -26.41 -2.43 IND 3.89 3.97 5.14 3.24
EST 3.97 4.43 17.19 3.22 CHN 10.27 10.25 8.15 7.72
LUX 5.00 1.70 2.87 0.31 Rest of Countries
MLT 5.64 -0.55 -6.41 1.00 AUS 2.86 4.43 4.97 5.60
SVN -1.64 -2.92 -17.81 -2.34 IDN 18.32 6.18 13.30 6.23
SVK -0.59 -0.56 -10.34 2.03 KOR 4.28 1.70 -3.81 1.96
NAFTA JPN 2.67 2.35 4.63 2.00
USA -1.37 1.85 7.34 2.21 TUR 5.51 -0.73 -7.68 2.17
CAN -0.03 1.65 7.01 1.77 TWN 3.21 1.44 7.92 6.26
MEX 0.96 3.34 2.06 3.90 ROW 2.47 3.43 4.54 2.61
Source: Own computations based on EC-AMECO (May 2013 Release), UNSD Na-
tional Accounts (July 2012 Release), and World Bank WDI (July 2013 Release).
Notes: GCF includes gross fixed capital formation and changes in inventories and
valuables.
